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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the notable features of Jair Bolsonaro’s unanticipated appeal to those who voted for 
him in October 2018 was his ability to associate himself, as a former army captain,1 with the 
military and with anxieties about law-and-order, personal security and policing. His election 
campaign made great play of his support for liberalization of Brazil’s strict guns laws and for 
aggressive policing, his signature gesture his thumb and forefinger pointing like a gun. He 
and one of his politician sons, a federal police officer, had been building political support for 
his candidacy since 2014 through their membership of a cross-party caucus in Chamber of 
Deputies known as the bancada da bala (literally, ‘bullet bench’), composed of former 
police officers, firearms industry lobbyists and tough-on-crime advocates. In consequence, 
not only were the police and military two of the constituencies who most identified with, 
and heavily supported, Bolsonaro, but his popularity in the polls also helped to elect an 
unprecedented number of former security service members to the National Congress and to 
state legislatures around the country. Of the 52 federal deputies that Bolsonaro’s party, the 
PSL, elected to the lower house, 40 per cent (21) have a police or military background. Other 
parties elected an additional 21 representatives from the security services.2 This has given 
security actors their biggest presence in legislative politics since the return to democracy in 
the 1980s. Indeed, if they were a party they would be second largest. 
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 He graduated from military academy in 1977. He caught public attention in 1986 when he published a letter 
in a mainstream news magazine advocating higher salaries for the military, which earned him 15 days in a 
military brig for bringing the institution into disrepute. He became a reservist in 1988 and got elected city 
councillor in Rio de Janeiro, the start of his long political career. 
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 Information from the Inter-Union Parliamentary Advisory Service (DIAP) 
http://www.diap.org.br/index.php/noticias/agencia-diap/28531-eleicoes-2018-bancada-linha-dura-da-
seguranca-publica-cresce-na-camara-e-no-senado 
However, this pursuit of elected office, particularly on the part of police, did not spring out 
of nowhere. Their desire to represent their professional interests and political agenda 
directly has been quietly growing for at least a decade. This chapter looks at how and why 
so many police and security actors have entered politics, what their agendas might be in a 
Bolsonaro administration, and what this means for law-and-order policy specifically, and 
Brazilian democracy more generally. 
 
1. Police and politics 
 
The police in Brazil have historically been more accustomed to being political instruments 
than representing themselves politically.  Their sense of themselves as a political or 
professional group has been shaped by how the police are organized administratively and 
by the changes and continuities in policing over the last few decades. The two main police 
forces are the Military Police, who conduct on-street, preventive policing, and the Civil 
Police, who carry out criminal investigations. Both are governed locally by the political 
authorities of the 26 states and the Federal District. The Military Police have by far the 
larger contingent, with around 500,000 officers nationwide. They are linked constitutionally 
to the armed forces, but on a day-to-day operational level the two generally function quite 
separately. However, they retain a militarized hierarchy and culture that imbues their 
training, discipline and ethos (Muniz 2001). Since its inception the Military Police have been 
cast as a reserve force for the armed forces, and vice versa. President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso enshrined in the 1988 Constitution the army’s backup role in urban crime fighting, 
and they have been deployed in the poorest neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro several 
times, most recently in 2018. The term militar is thus used rather loosely, to mean either 
‘armed forces’, ‘military police,’ or both, or even to encompass the Civil Police, which have a 
completely different training and career structure, and only around 100,000 officers. 
 
The institutional roots of these two main police forces lie in the extended military-civilian 
regime of 1964-85 which centralized control over the security agencies. The state-level 
military and civil police forces were subordinated to the armed forces’ mission of repressing 
political opponents, adopting their tactics of torture, extra-judicial executions and death 
squad extermination used against both enemies of the state and ordinary criminals 
(Barcellos 1992). In this task the police enjoyed impunity and operational latitude, and 
during the prolonged, negotiated transition to democracy, controlled by the armed forces, 
there was no purging of police ranks, restructuring or retraining. Police reform was also not 
on the agenda during the drafting of the 1988 Constitution, which enshrined some 
problematic provisions. For example, it left the Military Police protected by the Military 
Courts (Pereira 2001), as well as a militarized conception of public security and policing that 
has not been effectively challenged. 
 
In the last two decades other police forces have also emerged. The Federal Police, now with 
over 13,000 officers, were much strengthened under the Lula governments as a ‘Brazilian 
FBI’. They investigate transnational and complex, high-level political crimes, so they have 
been central to the Lava-Jato corruption investigations. The Ministry of Justice also oversees 
a Federal Highway Police, with its own career structure. In addition, around one fifth of 
Brazilian municipalities (about 1,000) have a Municipal Guard, whose task is local crime 
prevention. However, it is the state police forces, especially the Military Police, that have 
been most concerned to have their interests protected in Congress.  
 
In the first two decades of the New Republic, the police used proxies in the form of retired 
governors elected to the Senate who identified strongly with the police forces they had 
deployed, and vetoed bills that threatened the latter’s interests. However, the impetus for 
police to directly enter the political arena themselves has roots in the state police strikes of 
the 1990s, and the subsequent formation of local police unions, representing not just 
individual forces, but different ranks within them. They began to organise collectively to 
elect members to municipal and state legislatures, and to the National Congress.  
 
The 2002 election of Lula as President, and thus the installation of the PT as the main party 
of government, prompted a mobilization on the part of more conservative forces in society 
who felt their concerns might be ignored or undermined.  A bancada da bala formed for the 
first time and denoted initially parliamentarians funded by the Brazilian firearms industry.  
In 2010, they were able to elect 32 senators and federal deputies, with campaign 
contributions totalling R$1.5 million.3 In the 2014 elections R$1.91 million was donated to 
21 candidates for federal deputy, 12 for state deputy, two gubernatorial hopefuls and a 
candidate for the Senate. The return to investment was impressive: 18 of the candidates for 
federal deputy were elected directly, the other three elected as stand-ins. Half came from 
the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, where the majority of gun and munitions 
manufacturers are located.  However, the term has now expanded to include not only 
former police and army officers, but also those who broadly sympathise with their aims, 
such as individuals personally affected by crime, or with a hard-line position on crime and 
punishment. The numbers of former police officers elected to the Chamber of Deputies 
remained relatively stable (seven in 2002 and in 2006, four in 2010), until it shot up to 19 in 
2014 when security sector candidates, including Bolsonaro himself, emerged as the highest 
voted deputies in their states as a result of their tough-on-crime talk. The number of police 
elected doubled to 42 in 2018. 
 
2. Why and how security actors got elected 
 
It was in the 2014 elections that police corporations began being more strategic about 
encouraging and supporting candidacies (Berlatto et al. 2016), and this bore fruit 
spectacularly four years later when the absolute number of army, and military and civil 
police personnel running for the National Congress and state assemblies rose to 1,250, the 
highest to date.4 Although the overall percentage of security sector professionals among the 
universe of candidates has not risen much, to only 5 per cent, the 2018 contest offered a 
series of fortuitous circumstances that enabled the conversion of these candidacies into an 
success rate four times greater than that of previous elections. 
 
The most obvious factor was deep public concern with crime and violence. One in ten 
people murdered in the world is Brazilian. In 2017, 63,880 people suffered a violent, 
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 All data from Instituto Sou da Paz http://www.soudapaz.org/o-que-fazemos/noticia/sou-da-paz-analisa-
participacao-da-industria-armamentista-nas-campanhas-eleitorais/62 
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 https://www.nexojornal.com.br/grafico/2018/10/31/A-expans%C3%A3o-dos-militares-e-policiais-entre-os-
pol%C3%ADticos-eleitos The data are derived from searches of candidates’ declared occupation in the upper 
Electoral Court, and cross-referenced with the rank and title they use at the ballot. It is indicative only, as the 
other security services are not included in this total, and some police candidates cannot be identified by either 
means. 
intentional death (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública 2018), and the numbers have been 
rising steadily, with a few dips and regional variations, since the early 1990s. Personal safety 
is now by far the top concern of the electorate, alongside corruption. Yet, law-and-order has 
been something of an Achilles Heel for the left in Brazil, which associated policing with the 
military, and thus as a right-wing concern. This is not to deny the importance of policies on 
violence and crime reduction introduced in Lula’s second term, but they were still too little, 
too late and were unsustained by Dilma’s government (Soares 2007; Souza 2015; Azevedo 
and Cifali 2015). Aside from the fictions and absurdities in Bolsonaro’s election manifesto (O 
caminho da prosperidade),5 he also alleged that where the centre-left had governed, crime 
had risen. Statistically this is true, but a better causal explanation between the local 
governments of the left is that, as prosperity increases due to economic growth and welfare 
benefits, crime increases, a well-known criminological phenomenon (Kahn 2018). This 
would explain why the PT candidate, Haddad, won comfortably with over 70 per cent of the 
vote in the North-East, the region where violence has increased most sharply in the last few 
years, but growth and redistributive policies have also lifted many out of poverty. This fear 
of violence had its greatest pro-Bolsonaro electoral impact in parts of the country where 
homicide rates are actually relatively low.  This is partly because there are other issues at 
stake, for example the presence of organized crime groups such as the First Capital 
Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital, PCC) a prisoner syndicate that now controls São 
Paulo state’s prison system and runs a trafficking empire. It was the PCC’s violent show of 
strength on the streets of the state capital, in May 2006, that put crime on the agenda for 
the first time in that year’s presidential debates and prompted a surge in police candidacies. 
 
That Bolsonaro himself became a victim of violent crime – stabbed in the abdomen by an 
individual whilst campaigning, just a month away from the first round of the election -- 
further fuelled this generalized sense of insecurity. His choice of a retired army General, 
Hamilton Mourão, for his running mate, and Bolsonaro’s own constant nostalgia for the 
military regime, suggested that a return to past practices of torture and extra-judicial 
execution, when the police were supposedly unfettered by bothersome concerns about 
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 It stated that crack cocaine had entered Brazil via the communist FARC guerrillas in Colombia (not true), and 
that a million Brazilians had been killed since the first meeting in 1990 of the Forum of São Paulo, an annual 
gathering of the Latin American left, as if the two were causally connected, which they are not. 
human rights, would solve the problems of crime. In fact, those practices had never gone 
away, despite the best efforts of rule-of-law advocates, as the data on police brutality show 
(Lima, Sinhoretto and Bueno 2015). 
 
A second facilitating factor for the entry of security service personnel into politics was a 
party-political, institutional shift. 2018 saw the collapse of the binary contest in presidential 
elections between the PT and PSDB that had dominated the past two decades, and 
Bolsonaro surged as an ‘outsider’ candidate (albeit a career politician of 30 years) as the 
public cast a protest vote at the Lava-Jato corruption scandal that had engulfed the whole 
political class. This intensified the fragmentation of an already extremely fractured party 
system – 30 parties are now represented in the Brazilian congress, making it an outlier 
globally – in which the cost of entry is very low. With a turnover rate was over 50 per cent 
and an open-list electoral system, in which voters tend to opt for individual candidates 
rather than party tickets, means that anyone with a public profile benefits from name 
recognition at the ballot box.  
 
That necessary notoriety is quickly achieved in the bubble of social media and the third 
fortuitous circumstance was the unprecedented deployment of the WhatsApp platform, 
used intensively by Brazilians, in these elections. It is both closed to scrutiny and has huge 
social penetration through ‘friends and family’ networks, which in turn gives the content 
that people share legitimacy and credibility. For much of his career Bolsonaro had been a 
marginal member of the bancada da bala, not much respected by the others. But from 2014 
he began to build a political base using his outrageous views, captured on film, which went 
viral on Youtube and WhatsApp.6 Police officers who became social media phenomena were 
urged to run for office as outsiders by their viewing publics, and became valuable electoral 
commodities to the parties that approached them or whose tickets they sought to join. The 
first two women Military Police officers to be elected to the National Congress had both 
been captured on camera using their service weapons off-duty in response to situations of 
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 By July 2018, Major Olímpio had one million followers on Facebook, Bolsonaro 5.3 million. However, as they 
noticed engagement slow down on this platform due to Facebook’s algorithms, they concentrated more on 
WhatsApp. Illegal campaign donations from business were used to pay for to boost hundreds of millions of 
posts through WhatsApp, especially in the last two, decisive weeks of the campaign. 
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/empresarios-bancam-campanha-contra-o-pt-pelo-
whatsapp.shtml  
violence. Major Fabiana, who ran for the PSL drew her gun to control street violence in a 
poor neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro. Corporal Kátia Sastre shot dead an armed robber 
outside her child’s nursery, and she used this footage in her election campaign. Sergeant 
Fahur of the Federal Highway Police in Paraná acquired 1.6 million online followers for his 
tough talk in interviews and videos about hunting down drug traffickers and other villains.  
 
In Rio de Janeiro, which has a tradition of security sector candidates, the police associations 
used the police WhatsApp groups to sound out support for various candidates so that they 
could strategically select which to back, one of the reasons for the surprise win for outsider 
Wilson Witzel, a former military man and judge, in the governorship race of that state.7 
They also increasingly organized themselves collectively around their own candidates to 
intensify messaging, social capital and group identity. There are 250,000 active or retired 
Military Police in Rio de Janeiro, with a similar number of serving and former armed 
personnel in what is still a garrison city. When family members are added in, this could be a 
formidable electoral force. The PSL alone elected eight Military Police officers to the state 
assembly and Congress. One message on WhatsApp commemorating their victory at the 
polls stated ‘Finally we are starting to come together. Our potential is even greater. We can 
tip the balance in any elections.’ 
 
3. Security sector agendas  
 
The crime and policing agenda 
 
The 2018 elections saw the bancada da bala nearly double in size from 35, in the 2015-18 
legislature, to an estimated 60 in the incoming Chamber of Deputies. For the first time, one 
will also form in the Senate.8 Bancadas function both as informal identity and affinity 
groups, and advocacy coalitions. Within the bancada, some members have been more 
active than others (Instituto Sou da Paz 2016: 13), acting as policy entrepreneurs and driving 
the ideas for which they then mobilise support through the bancada and through the larger, 
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 http://www.diap.org.br/index.php/noticias/agencia-diap/28531-eleicoes-2018-bancada-linha-dura-da-
seguranca-publica-cresce-na-camara-e-no-senado 
but more diffuse, frente concerned with law-and-order in the parliament (Macaulay 2017).9 
What, then, are its agendas and how has it managed to pursue them? 
 
Since its formation, the bancada da bala has successfully acquired strategic influence in the 
legislative space, capturing key committees in which the PT and other centre-left parties had 
once been dominant but have since neglected. For example, the Committee on Public 
Security and Organized Crime is a key agenda-setting arena, due to its filtering function: in 
2013 it received 246 bills but considered only 88. Yet since 2007 the chairs and rapporteurs 
of most bills were drawn from the opposition to the PT government. In 2013 half of its 
members were lawyers, former police chiefs and army reservists, and one fifth were 
financed by the firearms and munitions industry, (Instituto Sou da Paz 2014).10 
 
Indeed, since 2003, the priority of the bancada da bala has been liberalization of gun laws. 
Brazil is the second largest producer of small arms, mainly handguns, in the world, with an 
estimated annual value of U$100 million (Dreyfus et al 2010). Most are exported but the 
domestic market was depressed by the Lula government’s 2003 Disarmament Statute, 
which allowed only justice officials or authorized private security agents to carry firearms. 
The subsequent 2005 referendum to prohibit sales of firearms galvanized the industry and 
the bancada, who reframed the issue as the citizen’s right to self-defence in the face of 
incompetent policing. The referendum was defeated, in part due a protest vote against the 
mensalão scandal (the Lula government was found to have been paying off legislators). 
Some 40 bills were then put forward in Congress to amend the Statute. In October 2015 a 
special Committee, dominated by the bancada, voted to revoke the Statute, pending a full 
vote in parliament. Yet, not all police officers elected to Congress support this, for the police 
will likely be among the additional victims if more guns are in circulation, and a minority of 
elected police officers hold more moderate position (Faganello 2015).  
 
Similarly, the 2015 Parliamentary Committee on Inquiry into the prison system was chaired 
by retired Military Police Colonel Alberto Fraga, the bancada’s most active legislator. The 
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 The two are used interchangeably in some reporting, which is not helpful to understanding their political 
structures and roles. 
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 The left is represented by just one dogged PSOL deputy from Rio de Janeiro, Glauber Braga, who tries to 
down the Committee with procedural niceties. 
committee invited private security providers to give evidence and, unsurprisingly, the final 
report enthusiastically advocated more private sector involvement in the penal system. The 
Bolsonaro/bancada da bala position is one of even greater punitiveness, with pledges to 
abolish the recently introduced Custody Hearings, and end sentence progression, exeats 
and early release for prisoners. This will slow the rate of prisoners leaving jail and increase 
the number entering. Brazil now has the third largest prison population in the world, with 
over 730,000 detainees, which surely shows that the police complaint that ‘the police 
arrest, and the judges let them go’ is actually far from the truth. Bolsonaro was glib about 
the capacity of the prison system, which already holds twice as many prisoners as spaces 
available: ‘Pile them up, cram them in.’ This will be a gift not only for private security 
companies involved in prison privatization and construction, but also for prison-based crime 
syndicates like the PCC, whose recruiting base is the constant flow of young men into the 
prison system who turn to the PCC to provide the basic services that the state already 
refuses to (Paes Manso and Nunes Dias, 2018). 
 
A conservative coalition – the bull, bible and bullet benches 
 
The bancada da bala also derives its legislative clout from its strategic association with two 
other powerful and reactionary bancadas, those of agri-business and of evangelical 
Christians. Collectively they are nicknamed the ‘bull, bible and bullet benches’, or BBB for 
short. The second Dilma administration saw the BBB join forces in a grand anti-government 
coalition. Of the 367 deputies that voted to initiate impeachment proceedings against her, 
313 were members of one of the associated frentes, and 53 were members of all three, 
showing how effectively they could flex their collective muscle. They have also developed a 
practice of lending votes to one another to get their individual agendas through parliament. 
As soon as Rousseff was impeached the bancada da bala mobilized the BBB through the 
Speaker, Eduardo Cunha. It first set about reducing the age of criminal responsibility, set at 
18 in Brazil in line with the Statute on Children and Adolescents and United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Children. A constitutional amendment tabled back in 1993 
was picked up in 2015 by a specially constituted committee and approved by this and the 
house standing Committee on Justice and Constitutional Affairs, both by then dominated by 
the bancada da bala. Put speedily to a plenary vote in July 2015, the bill failed narrowly, but 
in an unprecedented manoeuvre, the Speaker returned it ‘amended’ 24 hours later for 
another vote, which it passed (Lino 2016).  
 
The three BBB bancadas share a deep world view. Bolsonaro himself has managed to unite 
two of the three strands of the right:  the authoritarian right (represented by the bancada 
da bala) and the moral right (the evangelical right), although his position regarding the 
economic right is more ambiguous.11  All three bancadas share a nostalgia for an era of 
social hierarchy, and a society that is divided into the deserving and undeserving, in which 
the ‘good people’ are collectively protected from the ‘bad people’, through what the hard-
line law-and-order lobby calls ‘social defence’. The lobby’s slogan ‘the only good criminal is a 
dead one’ is hardly new. It has underpinned the executions of criminal suspects by police, 
death squads and militias all through the twentieth century to the current day. But 
discursively it represents a backlash against the ‘guarantee-ism’, that is, the principle of 
guaranteeing human rights to all as a fundamental entitlement that had been established 
legally, culturally and institutionally since the return to democracy, and enshrined in the 
1988 Constitution. Religious conservatives targetted the standing Committee on Human 
Rights, and in 2013 Marco Feliciano, a neo-Pentecostal pastor, became chair. Since then his 
co-religionists have filled most of the slots on the Committee. These bancadas are 
composed of individuals that feel they have a social mission, given by God, or by their 
security sector profession as guardians of society and order, and are thus deeply anti-
pluralist. 
 
In terms of mutual interests, there is both overlap and divergence. The agri-business 
bancada is hostile to indigenous rights that deny them full access to areas of the country for 
logging, ranching and cultivation, whilst military actors see the Amazon as their domain for 
reasons of national geo-political security. The proposed use of the anti-terrorism law to 
criminalize social movements such the Landless Workers Movement (MST) and the 
Homeless Movement (MTST), which have engaged in rural and urban land occupations, suits 
both bancadas as it securitizes both land issues and social rights.  However, for as much as 
both dislike human rights culture and share a Manichean world view, evangelical Christians 
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 He did this neatly by getting himself baptized in the river Jordan in early 2018. He is Catholic by background, 
but his third wife is neo-Pentecostal. 
sometimes part company with the police lobby around aggressive policing, not least as their 
social base lives in precisely the same poor neighbours that are underpoliced, in terms of 
resources, and overpolicing, in terms of the use of force (Faganello 2015). The military, 
which strong geo-political interests, was also not happy with Bolsonaro’s decision to move 
the Brazilian embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, aimed at gratifying the neo-Pentecostals. 
 
Diverse security sector interests 
 
The diverse security actors now in the political domain do not therefore necessarily share a 
single agenda. For the first time, a contingent of seven army officers entered parliament, all 
elected for the PSL.12 These officers have proposed forming a bancada militar separate from 
the bancada da bala. Although the Brazilian armed forces are often brought into domestic 
policing issues, and at least one, General Girão Monteiro, has been involved in running a 
state police force, they see themselves as separate from, and superior to, the military 
police, and would prefer that the term militar was used exclusively for the armed forces. A 
specifically military priority would be to obtain greater powers and resources in securing 
Brazil’s extensive borders, an issue sharpened by the deepening crisis in Venezuela. Indeed, 
a panic about spill-over, in the form of thousands of refugees from the ‘Communist’, 
Chavista regime of Maduro, was a dominant theme both of the Bolsonaro campaign and of 
the PSDB’s anti-PT electoral broadcasts.  
 
The armed forces have also been unhappy with the way in which the 1964-85 period has 
been characterized. They continue to resist the terms ‘coup’ or ‘dictatorship’ in relation to 
the installation of the military-civilian regime, referring to it as a ‘revolution’ or ‘movement,’ 
and insisting that in a war against communism what they did was necessary and should not 
be subject to investigation, prosecution or punishment. Thus they would like to do away 
with the National Truth Commission, and see their narrative predominate over one focussed 
on the human rights abuses of that period. Bolsonaro fuelled this sentiment when he 
dedicated his 2016 vote for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff to the memory of 
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 It is notable that no members of the Navy or Airforce were elected: these two branches of the armed forces 
are smaller in number and more elite in character. They were, however, actively involved in government 
during the military regime of 1964-1985. 
army Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra who had headed the notorious DOI-CODI 
intelligence unit where at least 47 people died and around 500 were tortured in the 1970s, 
including Rousseff herself.  Present in much smaller numbers in the legislature than police 
officers, the military are likely to have more influence in the executive branch. One month 
away from the inauguration Bolsonaro had appointed eight ministers from the armed forces 
and three with connections to the same, but none from the police.  
 
Like the armed forces, the police elected to political office will pursue not only ideological 
goals, but also very mundane, corporate interests around salaries, pensions, working 
conditions, equipment, budgetary allocations, career structures and perks, all of which 
affect their relative status and prestige. In the Committee on Public Security and Organized 
Crime fully half of the bills considered by the committee concerned such matters (Instituto 
Sou da Paz 2014).  Bolsonaro himself, in 27 years in Congress, did not put forward any 
legislation to improve police working conditions, and his election manifesto went into little 
actual policy detail on how police would be better enabled to combat crime and violence 
other than to promise that if they used lethal force against criminal suspects, they would 
not be prosecuted. Within the bancada da bala five separate police forces are now 
represented (Military, Civil, Federal, Highway and Municipal Police), although the Military 
Police predominate with 18 out of the 42. Each has their own career structures, institutional 
cultures and remit and competes with the others for the corporate resources mentioned. 
The six Federal Police will be hoping to have their ranks increased in order to ramp up their 
anti-corruption investigations, especially following the appointment of Federal Judge Sérgio 
Moro as the new Minister of Justice. The Federal Highway Police ran their own electoral 
campaign ‘Law Patrol’ and the four elected will also campaign to increase their ranks which 
have remained static since 1994, about half what is needed.  
Conclusion 
 
So, what does this mean for the security sector and for democracy? First of all, anyone of 
any profession should be entitled to run for political office, and the security sector should 
be no exception. Advocating for sectoral interests is also part of the democratic game, and 
the police generally receive little support around their working conditions. However, 
collectively, as a bancada they have played, and seem likely to continue playing, an 
important veto-playing and agenda-setting role around law-and-order and human rights. 
This migration between policing and political fields is unprecedented and relatively 
unstudied, yet has implications not only for public policy but also for understanding new 
formations of representation in Brazil’s legislative spaces in a period of party system decay 
during this new authoritarian turn. This progressive ‘police-ization’ of the country’s 
legislative arenas has also affected all levels of government - municipal, state and national: 
São Paulo city council has had a bancada da bala for several mandates.  The unreformed 
character of the country’s security forces suggests that this phenomenon, rather than 
democratizing the police, will contribute to the de-democratization of the political field 
promised by the Bolsonaro administration. 
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